The influence of postevent misinformation on memory is typically constrained by postwarnings, but little is known about the effectiveness of particular features of postwarnings, such as their specificity. Experiment 1 compared 2 levels of postwarning specificity: A general postwarning just stated the presence of misinformation, whereas a specific postwarning identified the test items for which misinformation had been presented earlier. The specific postwarning, but not the general postwarning, eliminated both the misinformation effect and its deleterious impact on memory monitoring (using a classic 2-alternative forced-choice recognition procedure). Experiment 2 ruled out an alternative interpretation of these findings and replicated this postwarning specificity pattern using a cued-recall test. We observed, in addition to the moderating influence of task representations on misinformation acceptance, 2 unexpected facilitative effects on event memory caused by misinformation. Misinformation facilitated event memory during narrative encoding if discrepancies between the event and the narrative were detected (Experiment 1) and during retrieval if a specific postwarning was combined with cued recall (Experiment 2). We interpret the facilitative effect of discrepancy detection within a recursiveremindings framework on noticing and recollecting change.
Many studies on eyewitness memory have shown that misleading information encoded after witnessing an event has a deleterious effect on memory reports (e.g., Blank, 1998; Echterhoff, Hirst, & Hussy, 2005; Higham, 1998; Higham, Luna, & Bloomfield, 2011; Lindsay, 1990; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Luna & Migueles, 2009; Wright, 1993; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994; Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996; see Loftus, 2005 , for a review). Loftus et al. (1978) introduced a three-stage paradigm for investigating the effect of misleading information on memory. As an example of this paradigm, an eyewitness might watch a videotape of a burglar stealing a wristwatch (event) and then read a misleading narrative summarizing the event in which is stated, "The burglar stole a wallet" (postevent misinformation). A misinformation effect occurs when misled eyewitnesses are more likely than nonmisled eyewitnesses to indicate on a final memory test for the event that they remember seeing a wallet being stolen in the videotape.
An important issue to address is whether people who mistakenly accept misinformation lack confidence in their decision or whether they fully endorse it. The effect of misinformation on confidence is dependent on a number of factors, but several studies have suggested the latter. For example, Loftus, Donders, Hoffman, and Schooler (1989) found that misinformed participants responded as confidently to incorrect postevent details as they did to their memories of event details, leading them to claim that postevent misinformation created memories that are "quickly accessed and confidently held" (p. 607; see also Luna & Migueles, 2009 ). Henceforth, we refer to this pattern of impaired accuracy coupled with high confidence in endorsements of postevent details as the signature pattern of misinformation.
Warnings and Misinformation Effects
Unsurprisingly, memory theorists have investigated whether the effect of misinformation is moderated by warnings about the presence of misleading information. Previous warnings used in misinformation experiments have certainly been quite diverse, but they can be classified into two main groups: prewarnings and postwarnings. Prewarnings are given prior to the encoding of the postevent misinformation, and research has generally shown that they are very effective at reducing misinformation effects (e.g., Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982 ; V. L. Smith & Ellsworth, 1987) , most likely because participants can attend to and identify the misinformation when it is first presented.
The evidence on postwarnings-typically issued right before the final memory test-is more mixed. In a recent meta-analysis, Blank and Launay (2014) established that, on average, postwarnings reduced the misinformation effect to less than half of its usual size; however, there was considerable variability across studies. In some studies, postwarnings completely eliminated misinformation effects (Blank, 1998; Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983; Eakin, Schreiber, & Sergent-Marshall, 2003; Highhouse & Bottrill, 1995; Oeberst & Blank, 2012; Wright, 1993) , whereas in other studies, robust misinformation effects persisted (e.g., Belli, Lindsay, Gales, & McCarthy, 1994; Frost, Ingraham, & Wilson, 2002; Greene et al., 1982; Higham, 1998; Higham et al., 2011; Lindsay, 1990 , similar source condition).
Warning Specificity
Such variability of postwarning effects is not surprising given the heterogeneity of procedures used in different studies. Blank and Launay (2014) classified postwarnings along three dimensions, (a) their specificity (in terms of locating the misinformation) and the presence or absence of (b) social postwarning (i.e., discrediting the reliability of the source of the postevent information) and (c) "enlightenment" (a debriefing-like explanation of the context and purpose of the previous deceptive introduction of misinformation; e.g., Oeberst & Blank, 2012) . In this article, we draw attention to the specificity dimension, exploring a new aspect of postwarning specificity not included in Blank and Launay's (2014) analysis. Specifically, we examine the impact of a particular type of postwarning specificity-item-specific postwarnings about the presence of misinformation-on measures of memory performance and associated metacognition. We believe this type of postwarning to be considerably more effective than general postwarnings.
What do we mean by item-specific postwarnings precisely? A standard memory test used in misinformation studies will typically include, in addition to noncritical filler questions, questions that probe memory for details that have been the target of misinformation (henceforth misleading questions) as well as questions probing memory for details not associated with misinformation (henceforth control questions). When a general postwarning (i.e., about the mere presence of misinformation) is provided along with such a test, participants still face uncertainty with respect to (a) how many misleading details had been presented and (b) the particular questions in the memory test the postwarning pertains to-and this uncertainty could lead to less effective memory search and monitoring strategies (see later discussion). By contrast, item-specific postwarnings clearly identify test questions about items that had been the target of misinformation. Plainly speaking, item-specific postwarnings clearly distinguish "dangerous" (misleading) questions, that is, questions for which more elaborate search and monitoring is advisable, from "safe" (control) questions, for which such caution is not necessarily required.
There are both theoretical and applied reasons to be interested in the effect of warning specificity. On the theoretical side, a longstanding explanation of the misinformation effect is overwriting or destructive updating (e.g., Loftus, 1979a Loftus, , 1979b Loftus & Loftus, 1980; Loftus et al., 1978) . On this view, the original event memory is overwritten or destroyed by misinformation. Although the original overwriting hypothesis has largely fallen out of favor over the years, largely due to the finding that original event memories are sometimes retrievable despite supposed overwriting (e.g., Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985) , recently it has enjoyed a reappearance in the form of reconsolidation-based memory impairment. Chan and LaPaglia (2013) conducted a series of classical, three-stage misinformation experiments (i.e., event, postevent misinformation, memory test), except that half the participants were given a cuedrecall pretest about the event details before receiving the misinformation, whereas the other half were not. On a later true-false test that followed receipt of misinformation, they found that participants had impaired memory for original event details but only if those memories had been earlier reactivated by the cued-recall pretest. They argued that reactivating memories (with the cuedrecall test) produced a reconsolidation window during which the original memory must be restabilized. If misinformation is encoded during this window, this reconsolidation process is interrupted and can cause the original memory to be overwritten. They argued that their results "demonstrate that human declarative memory can be selectively rewritten during reconsolidation" (p. 9309; although see Rindal, DeFranco, Rich, & Zaragoza, 2016 , for counterarguments to this claim).
If the overwriting hypothesis has any validity, then postwarnings, regardless of whether original event memories are reactivated and no matter how specific, should not influence retrieval of event details. Simply put, if the warning is given after misinformation has been encoded, it will be of no help in retrieving event details no matter how specific the warning is, because the original event memory has gone. Thus, in terms of event memory, the destructive updating hypothesis predicts comparable performance between groups of participants given general versus specific warnings.
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On the applied side, postwarning specificity is of particular relevance to the modern phenomena of "fake news" and "posttruth politics." People currently live in an era of rampant misinformation. Websites, social media, mainstream news, and even the current White House espouse facts and figures that have little to no basis in reality. The sheer prevalence of misinformation puts those who are interested in separating facts from fiction in an awkward position: What should be believed, and what should be taken with a grain of salt? One tool that news consumers have available to them is knowledge that only certain topics are likely to be falsely reported. For example, news about politics (e.g., Brexit, U.S. election), leaders (e.g., Donald Trump, Pope Francis, Hillary Clinton), immigration (e.g., the "Bowling Green massacre"), 2 or race (e.g., police shootings of Black men; the Black Lives Matter movement) might raise a flag and cause people to be cautious. Conversely, information that is less sensational (e.g., new scientific discoveries that do not have mass appeal) is more likely to be 1 Warned participants may adopt certain strategies to limit the effect of misinformation in the absence of event memory, such as avoiding familiar items on a memory test for fear that they are familiar for the wrong reason. However, because the original event memory has been destroyed under the overwriting hypothesis (i.e., only the misleading detail resides in memory), these strategies would be of limited value in moderating the effect of misinformation across different tests.
2 The Bowling Green massacre was supposedly a terrorist attack referred to by U.S. Counselor to the President Kellyanne Conway in interviews with various media sources in early 2017. Reference to the massacre was intended to justify President Donald Trump's proposed travel and immigration ban that affected travelers from several predominantly Muslim countries. However, the massacre never occurred. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
accurate. Thus, the content of news reports can act like a specific warning; the veracity of some items of information needs to be questioned, whereas other information can be accepted at face value.
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Naturally, a similar type of postwarning specificity could occur in forensic settings as well. For example, suppose a person witnesses a fight between two people, Greg and Joe. After the altercation, Joe's friends, who were present at the time, gather around the eyewitness and argue that Joe was not to blame-that it was all Greg's fault-but introduce misinformation in the process. When in court later on, the eyewitness may be vigilant about answering questions specifically about Joe's involvement in the altercation because he is aware that Joe's friends may have influenced him with misinformation. 4 Conversely, the eyewitness knows that he didn't receive any misinformation about Greg, so extra vigilance answering questions about him is not necessary. Compare this scenario to a second one, in which an eyewitness receives a general warning prior to giving testimony to be careful about answering questions accurately on the stand. In a sense, the eyewitness in the first scenario has been postwarned about questions specifically to do with Joe's involvement in the altercation but not about other types of questions, whereas the warning in the second scenario is more general. The question we address in the current research is, compared to a general warning, how effective are specific warnings at reducing the effect of misinformation on later memory performance.
Processes Involved in General and

Item-Specific Postwarnings
How do postwarnings generally affect remembering, and how can specific postwarnings amplify the beneficial effects on memory performance? Eyewitness testimony involves the conversion (Tulving, 1983) of pertinent memory information into a statement, such as an answer on a memory test. In principle, conversion includes a broad range of processes, but of particular interest here is memory search, as well as monitoring and control processes. Eyewitnesses would have to generate candidate answers and monitor their likelihood of being accurate (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) , which potentially also involves monitoring the sources of candidate answers (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989) . Control options include the volunteering or withholding of answers (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) , testifying or not testifying answers , regulating the grain size or plurality of answers (Goldsmith, Koriat, & Pansky, 2005; Luna, Higham, & Martín-Luengo, 2011; Luna & Martín-Luengo, 2012) , or-in forced-choice recognition tests-choosing between provided responses.
Crucially, in eyewitness misinformation designs, these processes will differ substantially as a function of (a) the presence or absence of postwarnings and (b) the specificity of the postwarning. This is because postwarnings shape people's task representation, that is, their understanding of the memory task at hand and the necessary strategies to perform well (Blank, 1998 ; see also Lane, Roussel, Villa, & Morita, 2007 , for a related approach). Without a postwarning, the task is (deceptively) simple: Drawing on a default consistency assumption (Blank, 1998) , people will search memory for just one detail relevant to a test question and will accept any familiar detail as the answer-which of course may be the misleading detail. Source monitoring is minimal, because the two sources of information (the original event and the postevent account) are assumed to be consistent; that is, it would be sufficient to place the remembered detail within the general situational context. Any postwarning about misinformation will potentially undermine this consistency assumption and as a consequence create a different task representation. Endorsing the most familiar item or the first item that comes to mind is no longer sufficient; instead, people will need to search for potentially two contradictory details as candidate answers. Moreover, source monitoring becomes critical, because the sources of the details now have implications for their likely accuracy.
In short, postwarnings have the potential to change the task representation from a simple but problematic one (i.e., search for one familiar detail and report it as the answer: search-and-accept) to a complex but enlightened one (i.e., search for two contradictory details and monitor their sources to decide about their likely accuracy: search-and-discriminate). Because the latter would help to weed out some inaccurate answers, performance is expected to improve with a postwarning. Existing research has supported this analysis. For instance, Echterhoff et al. (2005) found increased source monitoring after a postwarning; Warned participants took longer to make memory decisions and rated their event memories higher on memory characteristics (e.g., visual details, vividness, and clarity of spatial context; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988) . Further, compared to standard recognition tests, sourcemonitoring tests have been shown to reduce or even eliminate misinformation effects (e.g., Lindsay & Johnson, 1989) .
General postwarnings, as argued earlier, induce a search for potentially two different details. What happens, however, if this search is unsuccessful and only one item comes to mind (which might be the misleading detail)? In such a case, any subsequent monitoring likely depends on what participants know or believe regarding the overall presence of misinformation in the situation. If they assume the amount of misinformation to be small relative to the number of questions asked in the memory test, they may take the absence of memory for two contradictory details as evidence that there was no misinformation (similar to the impact of subjective theories about the memorability of items; Strack & Bless, 1994) . As a consequence, they may forego any further source monitoring to validate the accuracy of the remembered detail. That is, general postwarnings may produce only lax monitoring overall, potentially allowing some misinformation to "slip through the net."
Now consider item-specific postwarnings, which indicate exactly those questions on the memory test for which misinformation had been presented earlier. Such postwarnings will optimize the task representation such that participants will adopt a search-anddiscriminate approach for misleading items and can safely adopt a search-and-accept approach for control items. This, first and foremost, means stricter monitoring and control, but it should also have consequences for memory search. When only one detail comes up initially for a designated two-detail question, people may search memory harder for a second detail, and in some cases this may be successful. In short, item-specific postwarnings should help to reject misleading details and (perhaps to a lesser degree) retrieve original event details, hence improving memory performance across the board.
Finally, note that our analysis of the effects of general and item-specific postwarnings pointed to parallel expected effects on memory performance and metacognition (i.e., both improved memory performance and a reduced signature pattern of overconfidence in misinformation). This is because these effects are mediated through respective (less or more effective) task representations, which-as we argued earlier-have consequences for both memory and metamemory processes. We tested these ideas in two experiments.
Experimental Overview
We present two experiments that investigated the moderating influence of general and item-specific postwarnings on misinformation's effect on memory performance and confidence. In Experiment 1, two groups both received a general postwarning. The general-warning group received just this postwarning, but the specific-warning group received the general postwarning as well as item-specific postwarnings that informed participants about whether each test question was a misleading question or a control question, with a clear explication of what this meant. Experiment 1 also probed how perceived discrepancies between details impacted on memory performance. Whereas Experiment 1 used a standard two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) recognition test to assess memory performance, Experiment 2 employed a cued-recall test to rule out an alternative interpretation of the Experiment 1 specific-warning group results.
Experiment 1
In this experiment, participants studied a series of slides depicting a murder scene. Following each slide, participants read a brief narrative about that slide that contained one piece of misinformation. Later, a 2AFC recognition memory test assessed participants' memory for the event details. Crucially, we investigated the effect of two types of postwarnings. Half of the participants were given just a general postwarning, immediately prior to the memory test, about the presence of misinformation in the narratives. The other half received the general postwarning as well as an item-specific postwarning. To implement the latter postwarning type, we colorcoded test questions according to whether each question queried misleading (red) versus control (green) items.
Experiment 1 also explored the role of discrepancy detection in combination with a general postwarning. Several studies have noted that discrepancy detection plays an important role in moderating the misinformation effect because it puts participants in a position to discount misleading details (e.g., Blank, 1998; Higham, 1998; Pohl, Schumacher, & Friedrich, 1993; Schooler & Loftus, 1986; Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986) . Our interest here, however, was more in determining the outcome if participants failed to detect any discrepancy but still received a postwarning. As argued earlier, lack of subjective evidence of the presence of two discrepant details may give participants license to adopt an inadequate searchand-accept task representation, rendering a general postwarning ineffective in such cases. By contrast, the item-specific postwarning should still ensure an adequate search-and-discriminate task representation even in cases where no discrepancy was detected, leading to better memory performance than in the general-warning group.
Method
Participants. A total of 48 students from the University of Southampton participated individually in the experiment in exchange for course credits. Ages ranged from 18 to 56 years (M ϭ 21.65, SD ϭ 8.53). Twenty-four participants (23 female, 1 male) were assigned to the general-warning group, and 24 (23 female, 1 male) to the specific-warning group.
Design and materials. The "crime scene" consisted of 15 slides (digital photographs) and 15 corresponding narratives showing and describing a staged murder. The slides showed the perpetrator's car leaving the crime scene, the victim's home, a knife, and the victim's body. The narratives contained 30 critical details, two pertaining to each slide in the crime-scene sequence. One version of each critical detail (misinformation) misrepresented the detail in the slide (e.g., bungalow was mentioned in the narrative when in fact a two-story house had been shown in the slide). The other version (control) either omitted the misinformation or described the detail in neutral form (e.g., building). The presence/absence of misinformation was varied within-subjects: For any given participant, half the critical details (one per slide) occurred in their misleading form and half in their control form, with the assignment of critical details to the control versus misleading forms counterbalanced across participants. The photographs that made up the slide sequence remained the same and were presented in the same order in the two counterbalanced formats.
A 30-item two-alternative recognition memory test was constructed and made into booklets. Each booklet contained a page of instructions followed by five pages containing a total of 30 questions. For each question, there were spaces to write an answer (A or B), a confidence rating about the accuracy of each response on a scale ranging from 50% (guess) to 100% (very confident), and a decision about testifying (Y/N).
5 Each question on the test queried one critical detail, and the two choices for each question were the correct event detail (e.g., two-storey house) and the misleading detail (e.g., bungalow). The questions appeared in chronological order, starting with questions about Slide 1 and ending with questions about Slide 15. Across questions, option A versus B represented the correct answer 14 versus 16 times, respectively.
Procedure. Participants entered the lab and were seated in front of an Apple 24-in. iMac computer, which was used to present the crime-scene slides and narratives using Apple Keynote software. The first two slides contained instructions that informed participants that they would be shown a series of slides and written descriptions depicting a murder scene. They were informed that they should study the slides and descriptions closely. They were also told that it was vital that any information they provide in the experiment be accurate and informative and to ask any questions before proceeding. Participants then viewed the slides one at a 5 Following Higham, Luna, and Bloomfield (2011) , a side issue explored in both of our experiments was the impact of a testify option, as a supplementary and ecologically valid index of confidence, on memory performance and confidence. The findings largely paralleled the confidence findings and are therefore not reported. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
time. Eight seconds were allotted to study each slide, after which the screen went blank, and then a written narrative that described the details of the slide appeared. The narratives corresponding to each slide ranged in length depending on the amount of detail depicted. Longer display times were implemented for longer narratives, so that all participants could finish reading them (range ϭ 15-25 s). After the slide show and narratives had been presented, participants were given a Sudoku puzzle to complete for 10 min as a distractor task. They then completed a test booklet containing a set of instructions on the first page (which included a postwarningsee later) and the questions for the recognition memory test on subsequent pages. While answering questions on the test, participants were asked to imagine that they were in a courtroom. They were instructed to answer all questions. A 50%-100% confidence rating was also required.
6 After finishing the test, all participants were asked, "Did you notice any discrepancies between the pictures presented and the slide narratives?" If participants indicated "yes" to this question, they were asked to "go back over the questionnaire and put a tick in the right hand margin corresponding to the questions that you recognized as having such a discrepancy." 7 Postwarnings. Participants in both the general-warning and specific-warning groups were postwarned about the presence of misinformation in the narratives. In particular, the following instructions were printed on the first page of the memory test booklet, which participants read immediately prior to completing the memory test:
IMPORTANT: The narratives that you read earlier contained some inaccurate details. Do not assume that if you can remember a detail from the narrative, that it is guaranteed to be correct. To perform well on the test, you need to accurately remember what happened on the slides, which may or may not correspond to the account in the narratives.
In addition to this general postwarning, participants in the specific-warning group were informed on an item-by-item basis which 15 test questions pertained to details for which there was misinformation presented earlier (misleading questions) and which 15 questions did not (control questions). This was achieved by printing the former question type in red typeface and the latter question type in green typeface and informing participants about the association between color and question type in the instructions given just prior to the memory test. Specifically, the following directions were printed on the first page of the memory-test booklet that contained the rest of the instructions: PLEASE NOTE: There are 30 questions in total, each with two alternative answers. Fifteen of these questions relate to details about which you have been misinformed. In other words, a narrative that you read contained misleading information about that detail, so you have to be very careful when answering these questions. For these questions, one alternative is correct (i.e., it appeared only in the slides) whereas the other is incorrect (i.e., it was read about only in the narrative). The other 15 questions relate to details about which you have received no misinformation. In other words, the narrative did not contain misleading information about that detail. For these questions, one alternative is correct (i.e., it appeared only in the slides) whereas the other is incorrect (i.e., it is a new detail). To help you answer the questions correctly and make decisions about which answers to use in your testimony, misinformation questions are written in RED, whereas nonmisleading questions are written in GREEN.
All test questions appeared in black (consistent with the rest of the questionnaire) for participants in the general-warning group.
Results and Discussion
Some analyses required excluding a few participants because of empty or undefined cells. For example, if accuracy for a particular participant was 100%, then it was not possible to compute mean confidence for incorrect answers. Because many of our analyses were repeated-measures, the number of participants contributing data to different analyses varied (e.g., fewer participants were likely to contribute data to all cells in larger analyses involving many conditions compared to smaller analyses involving only a few conditions). The number of missing cases for each analysis is indicated in footnotes throughout the Results and Discussion sections. For the tables, the means and standard errors are based on all available data for each cell and may vary slightly from the means yielded from analyses for which participants were excluded. We first conducted analyses on all responses, followed by further analyses that separated items according to whether a discrepancy was not detected.
Memory performance. Mean accuracy is shown in Table 1 . A 2 (question type: misleading, control) ϫ 2 (group: specificwarning, general-warning) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) on accuracy revealed a significant effect of question type, F(1, 46) ϭ 15.42, MSE ϭ .02, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .25, which was qualified by a Question Type ϫ Group interaction, F(1, 46) ϭ 6.60, MSE ϭ .02, p ϭ .013, p 2 ϭ .13. Accuracy was higher for control items (M ϭ .76, SEM ϭ .02) than misleading items (M ϭ .65, SEM ϭ .03), but as shown in Table 1 , this difference existed in only the general-warning group, F(1, 23) ϭ 25.31, MSE ϭ .02, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .52. The misinformation effect was eliminated when specific postwarnings were made available (F Ͻ 1). The main effect of group was not significant, F(1, 46) ϭ 2.29, MSE ϭ .03, p ϭ .14, p 2 ϭ .05. 6 As participants manually entered their confidence ratings on a blank space, they were free to ignore instructions and provide confidence ratings lower than 50%. This happened infrequently, though; 3% of the ratings in Experiment 1 (6% in the general-warning group and 0% in the specificwarning group) were in this range. (Experiment 2 used a 0%-100% confidence rating instruction). 7 Discrepancies may have been detected during narrative encoding and/or later when the two discrepant details were explicitly presented to participants on the 2AFC recognition test. In contrast to our methodology that required participants to identify discrepancies at test, research on noticing and recollecting change, discussed in more detail later in this article, has typically required participants to identify discrepancies as they are first presented (e.g., Jacoby, Wahlheim, & Kelley, 2015) . Requiring participants to identify discrepancies as soon as they are presented rather than later during testing means that no detected discrepancies are forgotten. However, it was not possible to follow this procedure in our design, because alerting participants to the presence of discrepancies prior to narrative encoding would have constituted a prewarning rather than a postwarning. Thus, although we admit that our procedure may have missed some discrepancy detection (e.g., some discrepancies detected during narrative encoding may have been forgotten by the time the test was written), as will become apparent, discrepancy-detection decisions made during the test were still informative about the underlying processes. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Confidence. Mean confidence is shown in Table 2 . The data were initially analyzed with a 2 (question type: misleading, control) ϫ 2 (group: specific-warning, general-warning) ϫ 2 (accuracy: correct, incorrect) mixed ANOVA, with group as the only between-subjects variable. 2 ϭ .43, whereas it had no effect on correct responses (F Ͻ 1). Thus, the signature pattern of misinformation was observed in the generalwarning group.
By contrast, there was no such interaction in the second 2 ϫ 2 repeated-measures ANOVA on mean confidence in the specificwarning group (F Ͻ 1), only a main effect of accuracy, F(1, 20) ϭ 72.35, MSE ϭ 79.18, p Ͻ 001, p 2 ϭ .78. As with the previous analysis, correct responses (M ϭ 83, SEM ϭ 1) were assigned higher confidence than were incorrect responses (M ϭ 67, SEM ϭ 2). This result, coupled with the fact that no misinformation effect was obtained on accuracy in the specific-warning group, indicates specific warnings eliminated the signature pattern of misinformation.
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Discrepancy detection and postwarning effectiveness. Recall that at the end of the memory test, participants were required to mark any test questions that corresponded to a noticed discrepancy between the narratives and the slides. We used these data to further explore the effectiveness of general and item-specific postwarnings. As argued in the introduction, general postwarnings are ambiguous in that they leave it to the participants to decide which questions on the test the postwarning applies to and the task representation that would be adequate. If people failed to detect a discrepancy for a given test question, they should be more inclined to just search for one detail and accept it, possibly falsely (if it is a misleading detail). By contrast, detecting a discrepancy between the detail in the event and the one in the narrative should trigger a search-and-discriminate task representation and make people more resistant to misinformation by, for example, invoking more careful source monitoring. Thus, the task representation that is adopted for a particular test question in the general-warning group may depend to a large extent on discrepancy detection.
This logic does not apply to item-specific postwarnings, however, because, by their very nature, specific postwarnings already provide adequate task representations for both misleading and control questions, such that participants need not rely on the presence or absence of discrepancy detection to (mis-)specify them. In short, particularly the absence of discrepancy detection for misleading items should carry the risk of task misspecification and subsequent performance and monitoring deficits in the presence of general but not item-specific postwarnings. It is worth noting, though, that accuracy could still be poor for misleading 8 Four participants (one in the general-warning group and three in the specific-warning group) were dropped from this analysis because they made no errors in one of the cells. 9 One could argue that specific warnings did not reduce confidence in wrong responses to misleading items (general-warning: M ϭ 65, SEM ϭ 3; specific-warning: M ϭ 67, SEM ϭ 3). Instead, it increased confidence in wrong control judgments (general-warning: M ϭ 54, SEM ϭ 4; specificwarning: M ϭ 68, SEM ϭ 3). However, in our view, some caution should be exerted in interpreting absolute confidence means in this way (rather than relative patterns) because it fails to take into account response bias (see Higham, Zawadzka, & Hanczakowski, 2016 , for detailed discussion). It is likely that the specific warning caused confidence assignments to become more relaxed compared to the general warning, which would have increased both the control and misleading confidence means. If this difference in response bias is coupled with a genuine decrease in subjective confidence for wrong responses to misleading items in the specificwarning group, the result could be confidence means for misleading items that are approximately equal between the groups and control means that are different (just as we observed; see Table 2 ). Note. The overall mean for misleading questions is based on items for which no discrepancy was detected (NDD) and items for which discrepancy was detected (DD). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
items if a discrepancy were missed, even in the specific-warning group. For example, if the misleading detail were the only one recognized and this detail were misattributed to the event, then errors would result. However, we did not anticipate the effect of discrepancy detection in the specific-warning group to be as large as that observed in the general-warning group. Hence, our analysis strategy was to focus on memory performance and monitoring for these no discrepancy detected (NDD) cases and to contrast them with cases where a discrepancy had been detected (discrepancy detected [DD] cases; see Table 1 ). Overall, the vast majority of participants responded affirmatively to the yes-no question about whether any discrepancies were detected (general warning: 92%; specific warning: 88%). At the item level, the incidence of correct discrepancy detection (i.e., for misleading questions) was 38% in both the general-and specificwarning groups (both SEMs ϭ 4). The false discrepancy detection rate (i.e., for control questions) was too low to statistically analyze (10% and 1% in the general-and specific-warning groups, respectively). Therefore, our subsequent reanalyses focused exclusively on misleading questions.
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In the general-warning group, responses to NDD misleading questions were substantially less accurate than were responses to DD misleading questions (see Table 1 ). Indeed, mean NDD accuracy was below chance, plus 95% confidence limit ϭ .49, indicating that participants not only had their accuracy impaired by misinformation if a discrepancy was not detected but they preferred the misleading detail over the event detail. By comparison, DD accuracy was very high-even higher than control accuracy, a point to which we return later. The same general pattern of better DD than NDD accuracy was present in the specific-warning group as well, even though participants knew the appropriate task representation. We attribute this residual difference in accuracy to source-monitoring failures. However, the drop in NDD accuracy compared to DD accuracy in the specific-warning group was not as great as in the general-warning group. Indeed, NDD accuracy differed between the groups, F(1, 46) ϭ 9.02, MSE ϭ .05, p ϭ .004, p 2 ϭ .16. In short, failing to detect a discrepancy made people vulnerable to misinformation even in the presence of a specific postwarning, but the vulnerability was much worse if only a general postwarning was provided.
In contrast to the poor performance for misleading NDD items, accuracy for misleading DD items was near ceiling (see Table 1 ) and higher than control accuracy. This observation was confirmed statistically: Accuracy for misleading DD items exceeded control accuracy in both the general and specific warning groups, F(1, 21) ϭ 7.51, MSE ϭ .02, p ϭ .012, p 2 ϭ .26, and F(1, 20) ϭ 31.10, MSE ϭ .01, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .61, respectively. 11 This finding is potentially interesting given recent research demonstrating that if participants notice and recollect change in classical retroactive (and proactive) interference paradigms, facilitation instead of interference may be observed (e.g., Jacoby, Wahlheim, & Kelley, 2015; Jacoby, Wahlheim, & Yonelinas, 2013; Putnam, Wahlheim, & Jacoby, 2014; Wahlheim, 2014 Wahlheim, , 2015 .
However, before elaborating further on either this facilitation for misleading DD items or the impairment for misleading NDD items, we considered it necessary to eliminate the possibility of item-selection artifacts. For example, it is quite plausible that NDD versus DD items are ones for which event memory is poor versus good, respectively, and it is this variation in event memory that is the reason for the accuracy difference between the item types, not the variation in the rate of discrepancy detection per se. Indeed, a correlational analysis showed that control performance-as an uncompromised (by misinformation) measure of memory strength for original details-was correlated with discrepancy detection across the 30 test items (r ϭ .45 and r ϭ .49 in the general-and specific-warning groups, respectively, both significantly above zero; p Ͻ .05).
To investigate this possibility, we followed others in the changerecollection literature (e.g., Jacoby et al., 2015; Putnam, Sungkhasettee, & Roediger, 2017; Putnam et al., 2014) and conducted a hierarchical regression analysis at the level of items. In this model, accuracy for misleading items was the dependent variable, whereas the predictors were (a) accuracy for control items (as a measure of item memory), (b) the difference in the discrepancy detection rate between misleading and control items (the difference taken to control for guessing), and (c) the interaction between these two variables. Control item accuracy was entered first, followed by the discrepancy detection rate, and then the interaction. If the difference in accuracy for DD versus NDD items were entirely due to differential event memory, then the discrepancy detection variable would not account for any additional variance once the controlitem accuracy was entered on Step 1. However, if discrepancy detection per se had an effect on performance above and beyond variations in event memory, then discrepancy detection would account for some additional unique variance. Because the data patterns were similar between the groups (i.e., NDD Ͻ control Ͻ DD, with similar rates of correct discrepancy detection), we pooled them to increase power.
The regression analysis indicated that the total amount of variance explained by the three predictors was R 2 ϭ .63. As expected, control-item accuracy entered on Step 1 was a significant predictor of misleading-item accuracy (⌬R 2 ϭ .52, p Ͻ .001). More critically, discrepancy detection entered on Step 2 also accounted for a significant amount of additional unique variance (⌬R 2 ϭ .11, p ϭ .009). Finally, the amount of variance accounted for by the interaction between these variables entered on Step 3 was not significant (⌬R 2 ϭ .00, p ϭ .90). Thus, the regression analysis indicates that although item selection played a role in producing facilitation for DD items and impairment for NDD items, it by no means accounted for the full effect; detecting discrepancies also had a unique effect on performance.
A critic might argue that the association between discrepancy detection and memory performance for misleading items in this analysis may not be due to discrepancy detection causing better event memory but rather the reverse. On this view, there may be fluctuations in attention that vary on a participant-by-participant basis. For example, a random attentional lapse for one participant could interrupt the person's ability to encode the details of a slide even though that slide resulted in excellent item memory for most other participants. Conversely, another participant might idiosyncratically focus on an item that is missed by most other people. 10 All participants were included in these analyses. For those participants who indicated on the overall yes-no question that they failed to detect any discrepancies, all their test questions were coded as NDD.
11 Five participants (two vs. three in the general-vs. specific-warning groups, respectively) were excluded from these analyses because they indicated that they had detected no discrepancies. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Under most circumstances, such attentional fluctuations would simply be considered statistical noise. However, in the present context, idiosyncratic fluctuations may be problematic in that they may independently affect discrepancy detection and later performance on the memory test for that participant. Ultimately, the critic argues, there is only one causal variable, item memory, which takes two forms in our regression analysis: a stable, itembased component that is captured by average control accuracy and an idiosyncratic one that is captured by the discrepancy-detection variable. Critically, by this account, discrepancy detection per se has no causal influence on item memory or performance on the memory test, a conclusion that is completely at odds with our interpretation of the regression results. Although our data do not permit us to eliminate this account absolutely, we do not believe that random attentional fluctuations occurred often enough to fully account for the added effect of discrepancy detection in our regression analysis. First, control accuracy was highly correlated across items between the two warning conditions (r ϭ .74, p Ͻ .001). As noted earlier, idiosyncratic attentional fluctuations would introduce statistical noise into the estimates of control accuracy. If these fluctuations occurred with any regularity, statistical noise would be high, resulting in a low correlation between these variables. Instead, the fact that this correlation was high despite the different procedures implemented between the groups suggests that any attentional fluctuations were few and far between. Second, as we discuss in more detail later, a growing body of research across different paradigms, including the misinformation paradigm (e.g., Putnam et al., 2017) , has indicated that covert retrieval of original memories during discrepancy detection can have a facilitative effect (Jacoby et al., 2013 (Jacoby et al., , 2015 Putnam et al., 2014; Wahlheim, 2014 Wahlheim, , 2015 . Hence, we believe it would be imprudent to attribute the added effect of discrepancy detection in our hierarchical regression analysis entirely to random attentional fluctuations. Nonetheless, future research investigating the causal role of discrepancy detection in the misinformation paradigm might implement different procedures to more firmly establish causality (e.g., experimentally manipulate the likelihood of discrepancy detection for the same set of items).
Our final analysis was to investigate the relationship between discrepancy detection and confidence.
12 Inspection of Table 2 reveals a complementary picture to accuracy in terms of confidence for correct and incorrect NDD answers. In the generalwarning group, the signature misinformation pattern was preserved for incorrect NDD answers; that is, there was higher confidence assigned to incorrect answers to misleading NDD questions compared to control questions, F(1, 22) ϭ 18.02, MSE ϭ 127.67, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .45. By contrast, the absence of this pattern was replicated (with respect to the analysis on all responses) in the specific-warning group, F(1, 20) ϭ 1.03, MSE ϭ 118.53, p ϭ .32, p 2 ϭ .05. Further, in the general-warning group, there was a complete breakdown of discrimination between correct and incorrect misleading NDD answers (F Ͻ 1) but not in the specificwarning group, F(1, 21) ϭ 33.56, MSE ϭ 30.76, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .62. That is, the item-specific postwarning improved not only memory performance but also memory monitoring, compared to the general postwarning.
Summary and interpretation. In the general-warning group, we found a misinformation effect on accuracy, accompanied by a boost to confidence for incorrect responses-the signature pattern of misinformation. Thus, similar to the case in several other reports (e.g., Belli et al., 1994; Greene et al., 1982; Higham, 1998; Higham et al., 2011; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994) , an influence of misinformation was still evident despite participants' general awareness of its presence. In contrast, performance in the specificwarning group was much better-the item-specific postwarning completely eliminated the misinformation effect on both accuracy and confidence. Essentially, once participants knew which questions were which, there was no discernable effect of misinformation at all.
However, these beneficial effects of specific postwarnings were less pronounced if participants failed to detect a discrepancy between the detail in the event and the detail in the narrative. Under those circumstances, a robust misinformation effect was observed, even after controlling for item-selection artifacts, an effect we attribute to problems monitoring the source of misleading details that were retrieved without a corresponding event detail. Although these source-monitoring problems likely occurred in the general-warning group as well, they were exacerbated by an inappropriate task representation. Participants provided with only a general postwarning and who recognized only one detail in response to a test question likely came to believe that they were answering a control question and continued search efforts were unnecessary. As a result, they endorsed the misleading details frequently and with high confidence.
Finally, an unexpected finding was that retrieval of event details was facilitated by misinformation if a discrepancy was detected. Again, this effect persisted even after controlling for item-selection artifacts. Retroactive facilitation has recently been shown to occur in the classical retroactive interference paradigm (as well as the proactive interference paradigm; e.g., Jacoby et al., 2015) , and Putnam et al. (2017) have recently demonstrated retroactive facilitation in a misinformation paradigm. We believe this finding is important at both a theoretical and applied level, so we return to it again in the General Discussion section.
Experiment 2
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to address two issues related to the use of a 2AFC recognition test in Experiment 1. First, there is a possible alternative interpretation of the observed efficacy of item-specific postwarnings: As a simple shortcut for generating answers to test questions, participants could have decided, for some of the misleading questions, to just switch their answers from their initially preferred response to the other one. That is, upon learning (through the specific postwarning) that there might be a problem with the detail they remembered, they simply opted for the other alternative in some cases. If what they initially remembered was the misleading detail, this would have resulted in an apparent but not genuine improvement of memory accuracy in the specific-warning group.
Second, it has long been known that recognition, by virtue of being supported by the most efficient retrieval cue-the item itself-is not as vulnerable to retroactive interference (e.g., from postevent misinformation) as recall (e.g., Postman & Stark, 1969) . 12 Between one and three participants were dropped in each analysis because of empty cells. DD answers were not included in this analysis, because there were too few incorrect DD answers to make this meaningful. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Hence, even if there were a genuine improvement in recognition accuracy, item-specific postwarnings may prove less efficient in less supported (in terms of retrieval cues), but perhaps more ecologically valid, retrieval situations. To address these issues, Experiment 2 used a cued-recall procedure.
Method
Participants. A total of 44 students from the University of Southampton participated individually in the experiment in exchange for course credits. Ages ranged from 18 to 33 years (M ϭ 22.84, SD ϭ 3.49). Twenty-two participants (15 female, 7 male) were assigned to the general-warning group and 22 (11 female, 11 male) to the specific-warning group.
Design, materials, and procedure. The design, materials, and procedure in Experiment 2 were mostly the same as in Experiment 1 except that (a) participants received a cued-recall test after the postwarning, (b) confidence ratings were made on a 0%-100% rather than 50%-100% scale, and (c) no discrepancydetection decisions were gathered at the end of the experiment.
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For the cued-recall task, instead of choosing between two response alternatives for each test question, a space was provided for participants to write their answer. Confidence ratings and testify decisions were collected as before. Participants were explicitly instructed to guess if they did not know the answer to a question; this instruction was used to avoid losing too many responses for the confidence and monitoring analyses.
The general postwarning was the same as in Experiment 1. However, to accommodate the cued-recall task, the specific postwarning had to be amended slightly as follows:
PLEASE NOTE: There are 30 questions in total. Fifteen of these questions relate to details about which you have been misinformed. In other words, a narrative that you read contained misleading information about that detail, so you have to be very careful when answering these questions. The other 15 questions relate to details about which you have received no misinformation. In other words, the narrative did not contain misleading information about that detail. To help you answer the questions correctly and make decisions about which answers to use in your testimony, misinformation questions are written in RED, whereas nonmisleading questions are written in GREEN.
Coding of recall answers. Cued-recall responses were coded into five categories: (a) critical-event detail (corresponding to the correct response alternative in the 2AFC test used in Experiment 1), (b) noncritical-event detail (i.e., an event detail that was technically correct but that was not specifically the critical-event detail), (c) critical-misleading detail (corresponding to the misleading 2AFC response alternative), (d) noncritical-incorrect detail (any incorrect detail other than the critical-misleading detail), and (e) unclassifiable response. For example, in response to the cue "In photograph 1, what was at the end of the road?" the responses two-storey building, house, bungalow, a cat, and dunno would constitute Categories 1-5, respectively. After pooling the data from the general-and specific-warning groups, Categories 1-5 accounted for 41%, 19%, 14%, 21%, and 5% of all answers provided, respectively. Our analyses in the next section focus primarily on Categories 1 and 3.
Results and Discussion
Memory performance. Table 3 shows the mean proportion of control and misleading questions with critical-event details and critical-misleading details as responses in the cued-recall task. The former details counted as one type of correct response, whereas the latter counted as one type of error. A 2 (question type: control, misleading) ϫ 2 (group: specific-warning, general-warning) mixed ANOVA on the proportion of critical-event details recalled yielded no significant main effects, largest F(1, 42) ϭ 2.37, MSE ϭ .01 p 2 ϭ .05, but there was a significant interaction, F(1, 42) ϭ 4.51, MSE ϭ .01, p ϭ .040, p 2 ϭ .10. Follow-up tests on the interaction revealed little difference in the proportions of correctly recalled critical-event details for control and misleading questions in the general-warning group (F Ͻ 1), whereas in the specific-warning group, the proportion was greater for misleading questions than for control questions, F(1, 21) ϭ 6.05, MSE ϭ .01, p ϭ .023, p 2 ϭ .22 (see Table 3 ).
The analogous 2 ϫ 2 ANOVA on the proportion of criticalmisleading details falsely recalled found significant main effects of question type, F(1, 42) ϭ 29.36, MSE ϭ .01, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .41, and group, F(1, 42) ϭ 10.15, MSE ϭ .01, p ϭ .003, p 2 ϭ .20. False recall was higher for misleading questions (M ϭ .19, SEM ϭ .02) than for control questions (M ϭ .09, SEM ϭ .01), and it was higher in the general-warning group (M ϭ .17, SEM ϭ .01) than in the specific-warning group (M ϭ .11, SEM ϭ .01). However, both of these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 42) ϭ 11.40, p ϭ .002, MSE ϭ 1.84, p 2 ϭ .21. Follow-up tests on the interaction indicated a large misinformation effect in the general-warning group, F(1, 21) ϭ 37.68, MSE ϭ .01, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .64, but no comparable effect in the specific-warning group, F(1, 21) ϭ 2.14, MSE ϭ .01, p ϭ .158, p 2 ϭ .09 (see Table 3 ). Confidence. Participants' mean confidence in correctly recalled critical-event details and falsely recalled critical-misleading details in the general-and specific-warning groups is shown in Table 4 . As in Experiment 1, mean confidence was analyzed with a 2 (question type: control vs. misleading) ϫ 2 (response: correct vs. incorrect) ϫ 2 (group: general-warning, specific-warning) mixed ANOVA with group as the only between-subjects variable.
14 It revealed only a main effect of response, F(1, 30) ϭ 55.81, MSE ϭ 437.01, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .65. Unsurprisingly, correct responses (M ϭ 86, SEM ϭ 2) were assigned higher confidence than were incorrect responses (M ϭ 59, SEM ϭ 4). No other main effects or interactions were significant (all Fs Ͻ 1). The signature 13 Discrepancy-detection decisions were not implemented in this experiment because we used cued-recall testing rather than 2AFC recognition as in Experiment 1. For 2AFC recognition, it is clear which details were to be judged for discrepancies because they were presented to participants as recognition alternatives. For example, one test question was "In photograph 1, what was at the end of the road?" and participants chose between two-storey building (event detail) and bungalow (misleading detail). However, neither of these responses was necessarily made on the cued-recall test. For example, a legitimate response would have been house (counted as noncritical-correct detail; see the next section, Coding of Recall Answers). Because the details to be assessed for discrepancies were not well specified in cued recall, the discrepancy detection data would have been difficult or even impossible to interpret.
14 Twelve participants (five vs. seven in the general-vs. specificwarning groups, respectively) were dropped from this analysis due to empty cells. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
pattern of misinformation-greater confidence in incorrect responses for misleading as opposed to control questions-was still descriptively present in the general-warning group, but it did not reach significance (F Ͻ 1). Also, confidence in incorrect responses to misleading questions was descriptively higher in the generalwarning group than in the specific-warning group but again not significantly so, F(1, 39) ϭ 2.00, MSE ϭ 708.48, p ϭ .165, p 2 ϭ .05.
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Additional analyses. We conducted Experiment 2 primarily to eliminate the possibility that a response-switching strategy was the cause of specific warnings' having such a profound effect on memory performance in Experiment 1. Compared to the 2AFC recognition task used in Experiment 1, for which two candidate answers were explicitly presented for every question, no candidate answers were explicitly presented in the cued-recall task used in Experiment 2. Consequently, it was not as straightforward for participants to switch away from the more familiar (narrative) detail to a less familiar (slide) detail when specifically warned about the presence of misinformation and improve memory accuracy as a result.
However, the critic could argue that, although it is not as straightforward, response switching could still potentially occur in cued recall as well. Participants may, for example, covertly retrieve both the more familiar misleading detail and the less familiar event detail in response to the question. If participants are specifically warned that a particular question is dangerous but they are unsure about the source of each candidate response, they may strategically elect to report the less familiar event detail, which would lead to better recall performance. This criticism is important to reject because it potentially could explain both the enhanced recall of event details and the lower rate of falsely recalling misleading details, for misleading questions compared to control questions in the specific-warning group.
16
To address this criticism, we conducted two analyses. The first was an item analysis for which we correlated two variables in the specific-warning group. The first variable was the amount of recall facilitation for critical-event details that each question yielded in its misleading form compared to its control form (i.e., misleading recall proportion minus control recall proportion for each question). The second variable was the number of different candidate responses that were produced for each question across participants (set size). We reasoned that any given participant would be more likely to be entertaining several candidate responses for questions with large versus small set sizes. Furthermore, response switching was likely to produce greater facilitation for questions with small set sizes rather than large ones because there would be fewer competitors to interfere with reporting the event detail once the misleading detail was discounted. In other words, response switching predicts a negative relationship between these variables (greater set size, less facilitation). However, contrary to this prediction, the results of this analysis revealed a positive correlation between the variables (r ϭ .45, p ϭ .013).
Our second analysis focused on recall of the noncritical-event details in the specific-warning group. As noted earlier, participants sometimes produced details on the recall test that were technically correct because they were shown in the slides, but they were not critical-event details (e.g., recalling a house instead of the criticalevent detail two-story building). If response switching were the cause of excellent performance in the specific-warning group, then recall of noncritical-event details for misleading questions should be augmented relative to control questions, just as it was for the critical-event details. However, this was not the case; recall of noncritical-event details to misleading questions (M ϭ .15, SEM ϭ .02) was impaired relative to control questions (M ϭ .25, SEM ϭ .02), F(1, 21) ϭ 9.49, MSE ϭ 0.012, p ϭ .006, p 2 ϭ .31. Thus, specific warnings did not just facilitate reporting of any correct information-the enhancement was specific to critical-event information. Coupled with the results of the previous analysis, this analysis allowed us to safely eliminate response switching as the basis of our results.
Summary and interpretation. Similar to the case in Experiment 1, we found higher levels of misinformation endorsement with general as opposed to item-specific postwarnings in Experi-15 For these last two analyses, 10 participants were dropped from the first (five from each group), and three participants were dropped from the second (all in the specific-warning group), because of empty cells. 16 Although the goal of strategic response switching in cued recall is similar to that in the 2AFC task, there is an important difference. In 2AFC, the event detail may not be retrieved and may have no familiarity at all; however, participants may still select it simply to avoid the familiar (narrative) detail. In contrast, the event detail in cued recall must be retrieved for participants to be able to switch to it. In other words, response switching requires retrieval of the event detail in some form to operate in cued recall, whereas it does not in 2AFC. Note. Confidence scale was 0 -100%. Due to occasional empty cells, data are based on ns ranging from 17 to 22. The correct and incorrect answers taken into account for this analysis were the recalled critical-event and critical-misleading details pertaining to a test question (not any noncritical correct or noncritical incorrect answers).
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. ment 2. Indeed, specific postwarnings completely eliminated the misinformation effect even though the retrieval cues were less efficient (i.e., cued recall instead of 2AFC recognition). Moreover, strategic response switching was not the cause of this excellent memory performance in the specific-warning group. First, response switching was made more difficult by using a cued-recall task in Experiment 2. Second, subsequent analyses eliminated the possibility that participants overcame this difficulty by strategically reporting less familiar covertly generated candidate responses. An additional unanticipated effect of specific postwarnings in Experiment 2 was that correct recall of critical-event details was greater for misleading questions than for control questions, a pattern that did not occur with a general postwarning (see Table 3 ). We return to this surprising finding in the General Discussion section. Finally, Experiment 2 replicated the beneficial effect of item-specific postwarnings on confidence: The signature misinformation pattern was eliminated, whereas it was still at least descriptively present in the general-warning group.
General Discussion
The purpose of this research was to investigate the impact of postwarning specificity on memory performance and monitoring in the eyewitness misinformation paradigm. We conducted two experiments, the first using a standard 2AFC recognition procedure and the second using cued recall. Similar to the case in several previous studies (e.g., Belli et al., 1994; Frost et al., 2002; Greene et al., 1982; Higham, 1998; Higham et al., 2011) , the general postwarning administered in Experiment 1 was not very effective at reducing the effect of misinformation on either accuracy or confidence. Instead, the signature pattern of misinformation observed in other research (e.g., Loftus et al., 1989; Luna & Migueles, 2009 ) was preserved in the general-warning group: reduced memory accuracy and inappropriately high confidence when misinformation was erroneously accepted.
By contrast, the item-specific postwarning completely eliminated both the misinformation effect on accuracy and the exaggerated confidence in endorsed misinformation. Experiment 2 further established that the effect of item-specific postwarnings is not limited to peculiarities of 2AFC recognition procedureswhich could invite simple heuristics such as switching responses for dangerous questions-but extends to a cued-recall setting where such heuristics are of less use. In the remainder of this discussion, we address a number of particularly noteworthy findings before drawing some general conclusions.
Discrepancy Detection and Misleading Details
Why was the general postwarning administered in Experiment 1 not very effective at reducing the misinformation effect? That is, what differentiates our study from some other studies that did find full elimination of the misinformation effect using general postwarnings (e.g., Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983; Highhouse & Bottrill, 1995; Oeberst & Blank, 2012) ? It is clear from our experiments that failure to detect discrepancies was at the heart of the problem in the general-warning group in Experiment 1; accuracy for misleading NDD questions, for which no discrepancy was detected, was half that of control questions and significantly below chance. This large misinformation effect for misleading NDD items was preserved even after controlling for item-selection artifacts. These data suggest that the signature pattern of misinformation found in the complete data set described earlier was primarily driven by extremely poor performance (coupled with inappropriately high confidence) on misleading questions for which discrepancy detection failed.
Performance for misleading details in both the general-and specific-warning groups is depicted in Figure 1 (ignore the information associated with "E"-the event detail-for the moment). Given the importance of discrepancy detection, Figure 1 distinguishes between cases where discrepancy detection was indicated at test and cases where it was not. Figure 1 shows that if a discrepancy was successfully detected (left-hand side of Figure 1) , there was an appropriate task representation, which led to low endorsement of misleading details and low confidence assigned to the few misleading details that were endorsed (Outcome A). This outcome was the same regardless of the type of postwarning and corresponds to the outcome for DD items in both warning groups of Experiment 1 and analogous items in both warning groups of Experiment 2.
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In contrast, if a discrepancy detection was not indicated at test (right-hand side of Figure 1 ), the task representation and the ultimate outcome depended on the postwarning type. We suspect in a lot of these cases the misleading detail was the only one retrieved, but it was retrieved lacking source information. A general postwarning was not effective enough for participants to adopt an appropriate task representation and to be cautious about endorsing this single detail. As a result, it was fully endorsed with high confidence (Outcome C). This outcome corresponds to the results for NDD items in the general-warning group of Experiment 1 and analogous items in the same group in Experiment 2.
On the other hand, if there was no indication of discrepancy detection at test and participants were specifically postwarned, they adopted an appropriate task representation and endorsed the misleading detail with only moderate frequency and assigned moderate confidence to it (Outcome B). Endorsement and confidence were tempered under these circumstances because, although there may have been a candidate response for the question (the misleading detail in many cases), participants were aware that two discrepant details were associated with the question, even though they could not explicitly identify them. As a result of this more adequate task representation, a continued search may have ensued that on some occasions may have been successful, leading to somewhat higher memory accuracy compared to the case for NDD items in the general-warning group. However, if the search was unsuccessful, participants may have guessed, which would moderate both accuracy and confidence. This outcome corresponds to the case for NDD items in the specific-warning group of Experiment 1 and analogous items in the same group in Experiment 2.
More principally, the argument would be that (post)warnings are effective only to the degree that participants' subjective impression 17 Although the cued-recall test in Experiment 2 did not allow us to explicitly identify DD and NDD items (see footnote 11), the procedure in Experiment 2 was the same as in Experiment 1 up to the point of testing. Consequently, we assume that discrepancy detection occurred during narrative encoding in Experiment 2 at approximately the same rate as in Experiment 1. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
of the potential to make memory errors (implied by the postwarning) matches the actual potential to make those errors. Postwarning specificity (in our case implemented as item-specific postwarnings) contributes to postwarning effectiveness by narrowing this subjective-objective gap and informing participants' task representations and ensuing retrieval strategies (e.g., failing to recollect a discrepancy after being specifically warned called for continued memory search). We think that exploring different aspects of such (mis)matches between subjective and objective memory task contexts could be a worthwhile avenue for future research.
Discrepancy Detection and Event Details
Although failing to detect discrepancies for misleading items had a disastrous effect on accuracy in Experiment 1, particularly if participants were provided with only a general warning, substantial benefits were observed if discrepancies were detected. Accuracy on misleading DD items in Experiment 1 was near ceiling and exceeded control accuracy by a substantial degree (see Table 1 ). In all likelihood, this accuracy advantage was not solely due to the fact that memory for event details was good for DD items. Although the control accuracy exerted a significant effect in the hierarchical regression analysis, suggesting that item selection played a partial role in this facilitative effect, the analysis also pointed to an additional unique contribution of discrepancy detection.
Why would presenting misleading information to participants be associated with such excellent performance? As we noted earlier, Jacoby, Wahlheim and colleagues (e.g., Jacoby et al., 2015 Jacoby et al., , 2013 Putnam et al., 2014; Wahlheim, 2014 Wahlheim, , 2015 have investigated analogous facilitation effects in classical interference paradigms. In the retroactive interference version of this paradigm, which is closest to the paradigm used to study misinformation effects, participants first study word pairs in an initial list and then study a second list in which the stimulus in the pair is presented with a different response (i.e., A-B, A-D). Memory for the initial pairing is then tested (A-?, for which the correct response is B), and the typical finding is that memory is impaired compared to in a control Figure 1 . Flowchart of the underlying processes for misleading items leading to three potential outcomes in Experiments 1 and 2. In both experiments, discrepancy detection leads to fundamentally different results compared to no discrepancy detection. If a discrepancy is detected, regardless of whether participants are provided with a specific or general warning, misleading details (M) are associated with low endorsement and low confidence. Also, detecting discrepancies causes covert retrieval practice and enhanced memory of the event detail (E; Outcome A). The net result is high endorsement of E and low endorsement of M. If no discrepancy is detected and there is a general postwarning, M is frequently endorsed with high confidence, whereas there is no enhanced memory due to covert retrieval practice of E during narrative encoding (Outcome C). The net result is high endorsement of M and low endorsement of E. However, if discrepancy detection fails but participants are specifically warned, although there is no enhanced memory of E due to covert retrieval during narrative encoding, memory for E may be enhanced because participants conduct a more thorough search of memory at test. This thorough memory search may lead to greater retrieval of E relative to a general warning where the search may be aborted prior to retrieval of E (Outcome B). The net result is moderate endorsement of both E and M. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
condition (A-B, C-D). However, Jacoby et al.'s (2015) interesting novel finding was that if participants noticed that the response paired with the stimulus had changed between the first and second list (or to use our lingo, they detected a discrepancy), and they successfully recollected that change at test, recall performance in the interference condition exceeded that in the control condition. For example, in their Experiment 1, recall accuracy in the A-B, C-D control condition was 40%. However, if the experimental context was conducive to detecting and recollecting change, recall accuracy in the A-B, A-D interference condition was significantly higher, at 50%. Jacoby et al. (2015) interpreted such facilitative effects within a recursive-remindings framework (e.g., Hintzman, 2011) . A central tenet of this framework is that noticing change (i.e., detecting discrepancies) requires that the original, pre-changed stimulus (or stimulus pair) be covertly retrieved. Hence, the process of detecting change engenders retrieval practice (or a spaced covert repetition) of the original stimulus, which is well known to enhance memory (e.g., Carrier & Pashler, 1992; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006) , even if the retrieval is covert (e.g., M. A. Smith, Roediger, & Karpicke, 2013) . Applying this logic to the misinformation paradigm, which is a special case of the retroactive interference paradigm, the message is that discrepancy detection does not just serve to limit endorsements of the misleading detail but can also enhance memory for the original event. This enhancement is important because it suggests that, like the classical retroactive interference paradigm with word pairs, there may actually be two effects produced by exposure to misinformation: interference if a discrepancy is not detected but facilitation if it is.
Although the importance of discrepancy detection in limiting vulnerability to misinformation has been documented in the past (e.g., Blank, 1998; Higham, 1998; Schooler & Loftus, 1986; Tousignant et al., 1986) , little research has focused on the facilitative effect on event memory that misinformation can have when it is coupled with discrepancy detection during narrative encoding. One exception is the study by Oeberst and Blank (2012) , who found a memory advantage for event details in the misleading condition in cases where the task representation was very clearly specified. They attributed this effect partly to discrepancy detection during narrative encoding's leading to deeper processing of the event detail (see also Blank, 2005 , for related effects in a classical interference paradigm). More recently, Putnam et al. (2017) conducted two experiments on the misinformation effect using a three-alternative recognition test consisting of the event detail, the misleading detail, and a new detail. They found that, similar to our Experiment 1 results, detecting change led to greater endorsement of the event detail and lower endorsement of the misleading detail, compared to control items. These studies, together with our current results, suggest that facilitation of event memory due to misinformation may be fairly common but potentially masked in many studies by interference effects (i.e., the net effect of misinformation on performance is typically negative). However, if performance is made conditional on discrepancydetection decisions (as in Putnam et al., 2017 , and our Experiment 1) or if an appropriate task representation is greatly emphasized (as in Blank, 2005; Oeberst & Blank, 2012 , and in the specificwarning group of the current Experiment 2), then facilitation will be observed. Facilitation due to covert retrieval practice is depicted on the left-hand side of Figure 1 as "E: enhanced memory due to covert retrieval practice during narrative encoding." It is associated with Outcome A, which requires discrepancy detection. Outcome A corresponds to the misleading DD questions in both postwarning groups of Experiment 1 (and to analogous but not explicitly identified misleading questions in the specific-warning group of Experiment 2). In all these cases, retrieval practice of event details led to better-than-control performance for the misleading items.
Another potential facilitative effect of misinformation may have been at work in Experiment 2. In that experiment, we observed that cued recall of event details in the specific-warning group-but not in the general-warning group-was greater for misleading items than for control items (see Table 3 ). Because the two warning groups were treated identically prior to the memory test, the rate of discrepancy detection during narrative encoding (and associated Outcome A; see Figure 1 ) was likely comparable between the two warning groups and therefore cannot explain facilitation in one group but not the other.
It is worth noting at the outset that this enhanced event memory for misleading versus control items is completely at odds with the overwriting or destructive updating hypothesis (e.g., Loftus, 1979a Loftus, , 1979b Loftus & Loftus, 1980; Loftus et al., 1978) or modern reincarnations of it (e.g., Chan & LaPaglia, 2013) . By this hypothesis, the original event memory would have been overwritten by the misinformation, so there was no way that facilitation due to the receipt of misinformation could have occurred instead. Furthermore, even if there were a way of explaining the facilitation, the destructive updating hypothesis still leaves unexplained why the facilitation occurred in the specific-but not the generalwarning group.
The question at this juncture is: If it was not discrepancy detection or destructive updating that caused the facilitation, then what caused it? We see an important mechanism contributing to this facilitative effect on event detail recall in Experiment 2 as extended memory search at test specifically for misleading questions in the specific-warning group. In the specific-warning group, the adequate task representation conveyed by the specific warning motivated participants to continue searching memory for two details if they failed to detect a discrepancy for misleading questions (see the right-hand side of Figure 1 ). In contrast, there was no need to extend the search if only one detail came to mind for control questions, because participants were informed that there was only one associated detail. This enhanced searching specifically for misleading questions may have sometimes been successful but sometimes may have caused retrieval of the misleading detail. However, as we argued earlier, we suspect the appropriate task representation in the specific-warning group altered not just the time and effort devoted to searching memory to answer misleading questions but also enhanced source monitoring (i.e., the knowledge that there were two discrepant details invoked more stringent source-monitoring processes). The net result was better event-detail recall for misleading questions compared to control questions in the specific-warning group of Experiment 2 (i.e., Outcome B in Figure 1 ). In the general-warning group, by comparison, participants likely had a dysfunctional search-and-accept task representation for misleading NDD items that undermined the motivation to continue searching memory if a discrepancy was not detected and only one detail was retrieved. The net result was This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
lower event-detail recall for misleading versus control questions (Outcome C in Figure 1 ), because the one retrieved detail would often have been the misleading detail (e.g., due to recency) and the-potentially available-event detail was never retrieved, because the search was not continued. Generally, then, the group difference in event detail recall for misleading items reflects the differential prevalence of Outcomes B and C. The total level of facilitation (i.e., overall misleading minus control performance) observed in the groups (ϩ8% and Ϫ2% in the specific-and general-warning groups, respectively) reflects a combination of Outcomes A and (mostly) B in the specific-warning group and a combination of Outcomes A and (mostly) C in the general-warning group (with the contribution of A being constant because of the identical procedure up to the point of testing). Hence, the overall misleading facilitation effect observed in the specific-warning group of Experiment 2 may reflect both encoding-based and retrieval-based facilitation, whereas the absence of overall facilitation in the general-warning group likely reflects a mixture of encoding-based facilitation and retrieval-based interference effects (i.e., misleading detail endorsement) for different items that approximately canceled each other out.
Beyond demonstrating facilitation effects in the misinformation paradigm, the present findings also add to the nascent memory facilitation literature in another respect. Unlike the effects found with traditional interference designs and with Putnam et al.'s (2017) misinformation paradigm, our facilitation effects occurred without any explicit instructions to detect discrepancies prior to narrative encoding (see, e.g., Jacoby et al., 2015 , for typical instructions). Rather, because of the common consistency assumption in misinformation studies (Blank, 1998) , participants likely did not expect any discrepancies at all (they were alerted to the possibility of change only in the postwarning about misinformation). Therefore, any discrepancy detection occurred spontaneously. It would be interesting to determine in future research whether spontaneous discrepancy detection is more or less facilitative than is guided discrepancy detection. We suspect it may be the former, because spontaneous detection is likely more surprising and therefore should lead to more elaboration of the changed elements.
Conclusion
Our research adds to a growing body of research that demonstrates the effectiveness of (some) postwarnings against misinformation (Blank & Launay, 2014) . It extends previous research by focusing on postwarning specificity and examining the processes underlying general and item-specific postwarnings. By contrasting these two types of postwarnings, we discovered a potential Achilles heel of general postwarnings-their ambiguity in terms of the adequate task representation and retrieval strategy for individual test items. General postwarnings are-paradoxically-not necessarily general, in that they do not convey an adequate representation and effective strategy by default, across the board. Rather, their effects seem to materialize locally, when supported by memory for original details and previous discrepancy detections. In the absence of such support, general postwarnings may be completely ineffective. Thus, the varied success of general postwarnings could be partially explained by differences in these associated features and processes.
The effectiveness of specific postwarnings, in contrast, suggests that due caution when answering questions about specific topics or people can potentially overcome the negative effects of misinformation. This finding comes as some relief given the prevalence of misinformation in the form of "fake news" in today's "posttruth" society. As we noted in the introduction, specific postwarnings might take the form of questioning the veracity of memories pertaining to particular topics or people that may be associated with misinformation. An interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate whether self-generated specific warnings that are topic-or person-based are as effective as externally generated ones such as those used in our current research.
In a more general perspective, the differential postwarning effects featured in this article illustrate the complexity of the interaction between task instructions, stored memory information, misinformation, and metacognitive processes. Not too long ago, misinformation was believed to have simple, straightforward effects on memory for witnessed event details (e.g., memory impairment: Loftus, 1991; response biases: McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985) . The new picture that has emerged more recently highlights, in addition to such influences, a variety of processes that intervene between memory retrieval and memory report (see our discussion of conversion and metacognitive monitoring and control processes in the introduction to this article). In this new picture, external influences (e.g., misinformation) rarely have a direct, unmediated influence on memory. Rather, they are absorbed, along with other relevant information, in a constructive act of remembering. As a result, memory performance in the face of misinformation is sometimes impaired (the typical case); sometimes unaffected; and sometimes, when supported by discrepancy detection, even improved. Exploring the intricacies of the interplay between memory, testing conditions, and task representations along the lines sketched in the present research will help understand this variability in outcomes.
